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Abstract
Mobile agents have been considered a promising technology to develop e-commerce
applications, however the security concerns about the technology have stopped its
widespread use.
The identiﬁed security areas comprise protecting hosts against malicious agents,
protecting the agent’s transmission and protecting agents against malicious hosts.
The ﬁrst two security issues and the protection of the code state of the agent can
be solved by applying traditional security techniques. Even though there are some
works that manage the data state protection, its implementation is almost unfeasible
in terms of performance and complexity.
This paper describes a fast and easy to implement algorithm that a mobile agent
can use to encrypt its data during its itinerary. The algorithm only makes use of a
bitmap and XOR operations. The algorithm consist of applying XOR operations to
the data to be ciphered and a random bitmap, while the map is repeatedly shifted
to the right or to the left in order to compute a CRC ﬁeld for validation against
malicious tampering.
The method only uses basic bit operations so that its implementation is very easy
to develop. Besides, since it does not use any computationally expensive crypto-
graphic technique (i.e. digital signatures) it is very fast. In this way we manage
to have a secure, simple, fast and feasible protection algorithm to protect data
while mobile agents are roaming, where simplicity and performance are its better
advantages.
c©2001 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
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1 Introduction
Mobile Agent Systems are expected to make e-commerce transactions inside
virtual supermarkets. In this application area security is crucial since we
can consider that any application will not be useful without doing secure
transactions.
Mobile agents consist of code state, data state, and execution state. Mo-
bile agent systems are platforms that allow agents to migrate from one node
(a mobile agent system) to another, keeping its three states. While agents
migrate there are several security aspects involved. We can point out diﬀerent
mechanisms that must be implemented by the mobile agent system to ensure
the security of the mobile agent applications. Mobile agent systems basically
must provide:
• Protection of the agent system against attacks from mobile agents.
• Protection of the agent against other agents.
• Protection of information transmission between agent servers against unaut-
horized third parties.
• Protection of the agent against malicious agent systems (malicious hosts),
which includes protection of the data state of the agent.
Diﬀerent security architectures for mobile agents [1] and mobile agent
systems [2] [3] have used standard cryptographic techniques like public key
cryptography, or digital signatures to authenticate authorities and solve the
problem of protecting the host against malicious agents. Also, they have im-
plemented secure channels for the transmission of the agents by using SSL
or TLS. Nevertheless, the protection of mobile agents from malicious hosts is
only partially solved.
The code state of the agent can be signed since it will not be modiﬁable.
In this way, we can protect the static part of the agent. However, to protect
the data state (that changes dynamically) becomes a more diﬃcult task to
tackle.
There are some works in this area, described in the related work section.
However, there has not been found any solution having a feasible implemen-
tation yet.
Consider that most of mobile agent e-commerce applications do not need
to protect all the data state, but only some important values where agents
ﬁlter information and compile their results. The algorithm presented in this
paper protects all the data that the agent decides to encrypt by calling a cipher
function. When the agent returns, only the source server is able to decrypt
the sensible information stored by the agent.
The algorithm describes an easy way to protect sensible data that must
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be gathered and are carried by mobile agents alongside their itinerary. Two
principal advantages are highlighted: the algorithm is simple and feasible to
implement, and computationally inexpensive.
2 Related Work
Wilhelm presented a technique for protecting the itinerary of the mobile agents
by using hardware mechanisms [4]. He considered that software algorithms
were not enough to ensure complete security during the mobile agent’s itine-
rary. Even though the technique managed to achieve the protection of the
itinerary, its implementation in real applications becomes diﬃcult, since spe-
cial hardware is required.
One interesting approach to avoid the malicious host attacks was proposed
by Fritz Hohl [5]. This approach, which is called Code Mess Up, consists of
a combination of two mechanisms: the ﬁrst one generates a new and far less
understandable version of the agent’s code. The second mechanism restricts
the lifetime of the agent’s code and data. In this way, when the code of the
agent is messed up, the malicious server would take some more time in order
to understand the code and then attack it, but since the agent’s lifetime is
restricted, the malicious server will not have enough time to attack the agent.
In this way the agent remains untouched.
Another solution for this problem was proposed by Tomas Sander and
Christian Tschudin [6][7]. They presented techniques on how to achieve ”non-
interactive computing with encrypted programs” in certain cases and give
a complete solution for this problem in important instances. They further
show how an agent might securely perform a cryptographic primitive, digital
signing, in an untrusted execution environment. Their results are based on the
use of homomorphic encryption schemes and function composition techniques.
The last two solutions have two main problems: a quite diﬃcult implemen-
tation and a considerable performance hit in case of implementation. Perhaps
these disadvantages are the reason why these techniques have not been imple-
mented by any mobile agent system, as far as we know, and the problem in
current mobile agent systems is still unsolved.
Considering these related works, the goal of our research is to oﬀer a sim-
ple and feasible to implement algorithm that can be used by mobile agents
to encrypt the data that they gather while they are roaming in untrusted
execution environments, and without a perceivable performance hit.
3 Data Encryption using Bitmaps and the XOR Ope-
ration
The design of this data protection technique takes into account the fact that,
in most applications, it is not vital to protect the whole data state of the
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mobile agent but some variables holding sensible data gathered by the agent,
which is the main objective of the agent’s travel and need to be protected.
Typical examples of these applications are e-commerce applications in
which an agent travels alongside an itinerary looking for prices or particu-
lar services. The vital information that must be protected is the price or
service oﬀered in each visited server.
This technique requires that the agent travels holding data generated by
the source server that will be used by the agent to encrypt the sensible data
gathered, using fast XOR operations.
3.1 Usefulness of the XOR Gate
The main encryption idea is to apply the XOR operation between data and
a random number (expressed as a bitmap in a row of a matrix and known
only to the source server) to encrypt information. Once the agent returns to
the source server, the XOR operation is applied again to the encrypted data,
using the same random number, and the information is restored.
The agent in the source server will generate two matrixes with a number of
rows equal to the number of data items it expects to encrypt. Initially, both
matrixes will be ﬁlled with the same random numbers (forming a random
background bitmap). One of the matrixes will be stored in the source server
and the agent will carry the other.
For example, let’s assume a 10 (binary 1010) is generated as a random
number and put it in a row of the matrix. This number goes with the agent
and a copy is also stored in the source server. During the itinerary, the agent
gets a 3 (binary 0011) that the agent wishes to encrypt. The XOR operation
will be applied between the random number and the datum to be protected
(1010 0011), giving 1001 as a result. This datum is stored in the same row
of the matrix, overwriting the initial random mask, in order to avoid the next
server seeing the random number used to encrypt the datum. Also, the next
server is not able to know the real datum, since it ignores the random number
used to apply the XOR operation.
A given server will use the next free row available in the matrix to store
new data, as the occupied rows contain data encrypted in previous servers. In
this way, the current server will never be able to know the previously encrypted
data since it does know neither the datum nor the random number.
The source server had stored in a duplicate matrix a copy of the random
numbers, in order to retrieve when the agent returns, the data encrypted by
the agent while roaming from server to server. Thus, to retrieve the datum,
the encrypted number 1001 will get a XOR applied with the corresponding
random number generated in the source server (1001 XOR 1010), giving 0011
as a result (3, the datum the agent had encrypted).
To assure that the information restored upon return to the source server
has not been tampered with, and is the same information that the agent
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Table 1
Fields composing the rows of the matrix
Data Area of the Mobile Agent
HostID Data area to be protected CW CRC
128-bit 128-bit 128-bit · · · 128-bit 128-bit 128-bit
f 11 f
1
2 f
1
3 · · · f 1n cw1 crc1
f 21 f
2
2 f
2
3 · · · f 2n cw2 crc2
f 31 f
3
2 f
3
3 · · · f 3n cw3 crc3
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
f i1 f
i
2 f
i
3 · · · f in cwi crci
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
fm1 f
m
2 f
m
3 · · · fmn cwm crcm
encrypted in each server, a CRC ﬁeld is computed in order to perform an
integrity test.
The complete encryption algorithm is described in the next section.
3.2 Detailed Description of the Encryption Algorithm
A matrix with several ﬁelds is deﬁned (table 1), which are used to encrypt
the agent’s data and for validation of the data later. The matrix is initially
ﬁlled with random numbers, creating a background bitmap used to encrypt
data gathered by the agent alongside its itinerary (table 2). The matrix is
duplicated. One copy travels with the agent and the other is kept in the
source server. The source server’s matrix is used to recover the data upon
agent’s return.
Every datum to be protected by the agent needs a row of the matrix, so
the agent must know beforehand the approximate amount of data it is going
to use.
The structure of the matrix is as follows:
The ﬁrst ﬁeld is the identiﬁer of the server, as we need to know, for each
row, the place where data was encrypted. The second ﬁeld represents the
space needed to store the data to be gathered by the agent, in 128 bit blocks.
The third ﬁeld is the ”codeword”, which is a random number to be generated
in the remote server. The codeword is used to rotate data before applying
the encryption function. The last ﬁeld is a CRC, computed applying a XOR
operation using all the 128 bit blocks in the data area. This CRC is used upon
agent return to verify that the data area has not been altered.
When the agent departs from the source server, the agent carries the matrix
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Table 2
Matrix ﬁlled with a random bitmap
Data Area of the Mobile Agent
HostID Data area to be protected CW CRC
128-bit 128-bit 128-bit · · · 128-bit 128-bit 128-bit
0101... 1101... 0011... · · · 0101... 0100... 1101...
1100... 0001... 1101... · · · 0001... 0100... 0100...
1011... 0011... 0101... · · · 1101... 1001... 0100...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0101... 1101... 0001... · · · 0101... 0110... 1111...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0111... 1011... 0101... · · · 1101... 1101... 0000...
ﬁlled with random numbers, creating a background bitmap that is used to hide
information, as shown in table 2.
Alongside the itinerary, algorithm 1 is applied for each datum
to be encrypted
It is worth to note that, once the mobile agents arrives at a new server,
the new server can not access the information stored in the previous server,
as the background bitmap held in the previous row before the XOR operation
was applied can not be guessed . Only the source server, who has a copy
of the original matrix, is able to apply the inverse algorithm to retrieve the
encrypted data.
The CRC ﬁeld is computed in order to detect any alteration made by a
malicious server on the encrypted data. Without any validation action, a
malicious server could modify just one bit on the encrypted data ﬁeld and
when the agent returns to its source server it would not be able to detect
that alteration. So, the agent would recover a wrong modiﬁed value since
the source server just applies and XOR operation with the stored copy of the
matrix in order to get the encrypted value.
The CRC ﬁeld does not prevent a malicious server from making any altera-
tion, but it ensures that if an alteration were made it would be detected since
the CRC ﬁeld will be invalid. The bit rotations made in step 3 may appear
unnecessary. However, if the blocks are not rotated, a malicious server could
alter the encrypted information in just one bit in a speciﬁc position, and the
CRC may not change since each block is XORred with the next block. Then,
upon return to the source server, this alteration would not be detected.
On the other hand, once the random rotations are applied, a maliciously-
altered bit in one block would be detected, as this bit aﬀects many positions
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Algorithm 1 1. The remote server creates a record with the same fields than
a row of the matrix that the agent has.
2. The host ID, data to be encrypted in 128-bit blocks form, and a generated
random codeword (CW) are put into the record.
3. Each 128 bit block f ri is rotated to the left as many times as indicated by
the 7 less-significant bits of the CW. That is f ri ← f ri  lri , where lri ←
CW&07Fh.
4. Before applying the third step on f ri+1, the CW is rotated to the right as
many times as indicated by the 7 most-significant bits of the CW. Thus, the
number of times that each f ri is rotated is not always the same. CW will then
be CW← CW mri where mri ← (CW 7)&07Fh. Once the CW is rotated
step 3 is repeated. These tasks will continue until no more 128-bit blocks are
left.
5. The original CW is restored into the corresponding field of the register in
order to retrieve the original information using the inverse algorithm in the
source server.
6. The CRC field is computed as follows. The initial value is filled with binary
0’s, and then it is XOR’ed in sequence (from left to right) with all the 128 bit
blocks in the data area, giving the final CRC value.
7. Lastly, the corresponding row in the matrix holding the original bitmap is
XOR’ed with the generated register (data) to be protected, thus encrypting the
data.
8. The counter indicating the number of lines used in the matrix is incremented
so that the next row available of the matrix can be used. It is worth to note
that, once the mobile agents arrives at a new server, the new server can not
access the information stored in the previous server, as the background bitmap
held in the previous row before the XOR operation was applied can not be
guessed. Only the source server, which has a copy of the original matrix, is
able to apply the inverse algorithm to retrieve the encrypted data.
in the inverse decryption algorithm (since the position of that bit will change
after rotations are applied), rendering always an invalid CRC that will detect
the alteration.
To retrieve the information encrypted by the agent alongside the itinerary,
the source server just applies the XOR operation to each row of the matrix
that was used by the agent, with the corresponding row of the copy of the
original matrix holding the initial background random bitmap.
Then, using the random CW, inverse rotations are applied to retrieve the
real data that was encrypted by the agent in a given intermediate server. The
main advantage of this technique, encrypting data using bitmaps and XOR
operations is that is very easy to implement, compared with other methods,
which use very complex mathematical algorithms [8].
Besides, it is computationally inexpensive, as only very fast bit operations
are used, avoiding eﬀectively the performance impact of other techniques such
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as digital signatures, keys, or any other means that hurt performance.
4 Feasibility of Implementation and Incorporation to
Current Mobile Agent Systems
A great advantage of our protection scheme is the feasibility of implementa-
tion. Besides, it could be very easily incorporated to the current mobile agent
systems’ security mechanisms.
The majority of Java-based mobile agent systems deﬁne an abstract class
called Agent. All the agents programmed by the user inherit from this class
the required functionality, so that the agent can migrates from one host to
another or can create more agents.
This abstract class usually follows a pattern like this:
public abstract class Agent implements java.io.Serializable / public void run() /
public final java.lang.Object clone() / public final void createAgent(.....) /
public final void dispatch(java.net.destinationURL) / public final void revert() ...
We just need to add an addsecure() method to the agent abstract class
in order to allow the agents to securely store sensible information in the data
structure(the matrix of bitmaps) that is carried with them, so we could deﬁne:
public ﬁnal void addsecure(Object data)
The implementation of this method will encrypt the information using the
algorithm described in the previous section and will store it in the next row
available of the matrix that is carried with the agent.
The matrix can be easily deﬁned in Java using a Java array (i.e. an instance
of the class vector) that will hold the background bit map originated in the
source server. In this way, each time that an agent is created by a user
(i.e. commerceAgent), it will inherit the addsecure() method allowing it store
information in a secure way.
public class commerceAgent extends Agent .....
When the user creates an instance of commerceAgent, the instance will be
able to protect the information it is gathering, just by invoking the addsecure()
method. For example:
commerceAgent FindFlyAgent;
deﬁnes an agent of type commerceAgent. The run method of the ﬁndFl-
yAgent would contain the instructions to query the price of the ﬂy it is looking
for, once it gets the price it records for later analysis at the home server, so
the last line of the run method would be:
FindFlyAgent.addsecure(FlyPrice);
in order to protect the sensible datum it has gotten. The current server
will execute the encrypting process and will store the FlyPrice safely in the
matrix. The next server visited will not be able to ﬁnd out what was the price
in the previous one and it just will be able to encrypt the information that
the agent gathers in that server.
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5 Limitations of the Method
The algorithm allows to protect the information the agent decides during its
itinerary, and to verify that it has not been altered when the agent returns.
The algorithm does not prevent the possible alteration of data from malicious
hosts, but detects any modiﬁcation that has been made. In this way, if any
alteration is detected (which means a CRC ﬁeld is invalid) the agent will reject
the information since it would be considered invalid.
The current server will never be able to access the previously encrypted
data since it ignores the data and the random number used to apply the XOR
operation. However, it can see and copy the still available rows with random
numbers that will be used to encrypt the next data not only in the current
server but in the next server as well.
The ﬁrst, and most evident deriving of this, is that a visited server can not
retrieve the data that was encrypted before, but could easily make a copy of
the rest of the background bitmap. This means that a server could potentially
retrieve the data encrypted in the future by an agent, assuming that the agent
visits again the same server. Thus, an agent should not visit the same server
twice if it wants to be completely secured.
Another possible attack (although less probable) is that two cooperating
malicious servers teamed to retrieve the information carried by the agent. The
ﬁrst server would send to the second one a copy of the then unused part of the
background bitmap (the available rows of the matrix). If the agent arrived
later to the second malicious server, it would be able to retrieve the data
encrypted since the agent left the ﬁrst malicious server and then modify the
value.
To avoid the limitations mentid above, instead of using a random bitmap
generated by the server and carried by the agent, it can ask to the server
a random bit register each time it wants to cipher a datum in this way a
malicious host just could alter its data but not the data of the next server.
Obviously this solution asummes the servers transmite their information
by a secure channel like a SSL channel, otherwise it would be necesary the use
of cryptography technics to protect the registers.
The last limitation is that there is a ﬁxed maximum number of data that
can be protected, which is given by the length of the matrix (the length must
be set in advance). However, in practice, a reasonable length could be set,
according with the expected task to be carried by the agent.
Finally, this technique does only protect the part of the data state of the
agent that the agent wishes to encrypt. The rest of the data, such as local
variables, etc. are not protected.
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6 Future Work
We will continue working on this technique in order to implement an improved
algorithm that avoids the current limitations. Nevertheless we intent to use
only the operations included in this paper (bit rotations and XOR operation),
or equally fast or simple ones, so that we can keep its simplicity and fast speed
which are the objectives and philosophy of this work.
7 Conclusions
One of the problems that a mobile agent system must solve is the protection
of agents from malicious hosts, which includes the protection of the data
state of an agent. This is very important for agent technology to be adopted
in e-commerce applications, for example in applications where agents collect
information (such as ﬂight prices) for later analysis at the source server.
Protecting this data gathered by the agent (and not the whole data state,
which is not vital) is the objective of the research described in this paper. For
example, malicious servers should not be able to see or modify the information
gathered in order to change previous low prices to make its price appear as
the best.
Other techniques such as [5] and [6] try to solve this problem by applying
very complex techniques, which are very diﬃcult to implement, and, more
importantly, are very expensive computationally, as key cryptography is used.
This is a hurdle very diﬃcult to overcome in practical systems.
We propose a new technique to protect the part of the data state of an
agent (the data gathered the agent wishes to protect) that dose not suﬀer from
these limitations, as it is fast and easy to implement.
A matrix is generated at the source server, and ﬁlled initially with random
bit numbers. Each row is used to protect one data item, and is divided into
128 bit blocks. A copy of the matrix is stored at the source server, and the
other copy travels with the agent.
To protect one data item, the agent uses a row, and applies the XOR ope-
ration to the data item with the random number held previously, encrypting it
and overwriting the initial random number with the result. A CRC is compu-
ted using XOR operations also, in order to detect alterations when returning
to the source server. Some bit alterations would not change the CRC, so the
random bitmaps are bit-rotated n-times, as indicated by a random codeword
that is also held in the matrix (and is also rotated).
The original server is the only one able to decrypt the information, as
the inverse algorithm (basically undoing the rotations and applying the XOR
operation with the original random bit map) requires the knowledge of the
original random bit map and codewords, which are only know to the original
server.
The only limitation is that an agent should not visit the same server twice,
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or a server co-allied with a malicious server, as a copy of the matrix could be
made and subsequent encrypted data items could be retrieved. To avoid this,
if the servers transmit their information by a secure channel the agent could
ask for a random register each time it wants to chiper a datum. A minor
limitation is that the agent should estimate the maximum number of data
items to protect, as the matrix must be generated beforehand.
The technique we have presented removes the complexity and computa-
tional limitations of other techniques, which hinder the acceptance of agent
technology in real applications. Agent’s data state protection is made fea-
sible in practical applications, as no performance hit is introduced because
no expensive key cryptography is used. Furthermore, the algorithm could be
a lot of times faster than any other that uses traditional key cryptographic
techniques since only bits operations are used.
This algorithm can be easily integrated in current mobile agent systems
in order to create basic e-commerce applications that compile information
securely.
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